4/09/2007 11:52:00 PM
McGrath was quick to point out that the entire discussion of religion as Dennett paints it is focused on the meme. Dennett bases his entire paper on the concept of the meme, and it is on that issue that his house will stand or fall. As discussed and McGrath points out, memes are based on an analogy: memes are to information as genes are to biology. Like most analogies, they break down at some point. Analogies generally speaking not represent their analogs in every aspect, and are generally used to aid understanding, but they cannot be the analog entirely. The analogy between memes and genes is no different. To McGrath's analysis, I would add a few things.
First, I would add that genes are not irreducible. In other words, genes are self-contained—one cannot make a new gene by combining other genes and one cannot make another gene by deconstructing a gene. If the gene is combined or deconstructed, it will not be useful in biological terms. They can be no more complex or simpler than they already are. Because of this, one can map genes, locate genes, manipulate genes, and count them. Because of these properties, there are only a finite number of genes in any given organism.
Memes, however, are not irreducible. Given a meme, it can be broken into smaller memes, and those smaller memes can be broken into even smaller memes, perhaps with no end in site. Dennett uses the analogy of words. Words can be broken into letters, letters reduced to symbols, and symbols reduced to abstractions. Take for instance the sentence, "Memes can be scientifically observed and manipulated." If a word is a meme, then this sentence could be reduced to, "Memes meme meme memeficially memed meme memed." Then one could reduce the letters in the same way accordingly. Such a sentence could perhaps contain more memes than there are genes in the entire human body, depending on how a person wants to look at the words.
On these terms, the analogy breaks down. It would virtually impossible to treat memes in the same manner one treats genes; one cannot identify them, count them, or change them according. This doesn't make for good science, because there is no means to quantify, analyze or even recognize memes.
Second, I would add that the whole concept of a meme is somewhat self-defeating. As aforementioned, genes are a particular item: they are self contained, can be counted and worked on. The processes that work on genes are not genes themselves, but other biological processes, such as mutations, DNA replication, and protein building to name a few. Likewise, genes undergo selection, whether it is artificial or natural. Bad genes are weeded out of populations by selections and vice versa for good genes.
Memes however are different, because the processes that manipulate memes are memes themselves. If these processes are memes themselves, then it is possible that the processes will themselves be weeded out or replaced if the processes are deemed bad. If meme selection is a meme itself then it is possible that the standard for evaluating memes may change. It is even possible that the concept of meme themselves get weeded out. (It would essentially be the suicide of the meme!) Whatever happens in memetics, it seems that memes ultimate evaluating memes because viciously cyclical or self-defeating altogether. The processes that govern genes are independent of the genes themselves, and therefore are not subject to the same volitions genes are. This is not true for memes, so again the analogy breaks down here.
Third, even if memes are mutually exclusive and not self-defeating, what does one gain from using memes? McGrath pointed out that scientist and social scientists can and have applied evolutionary paradigms to other sciences without the use of memes, such as Freud and Marx. If memes catch on, it could perhaps slow, not help the process of science because sciences will have to be reframed in terms of memes. It would like going through the Manhattan Phonebook and giving everyone a new name in German. Such processes can over-complicate the issue unnecessarily, and not to mention the time that would be needed to undertake such projects. In the end, it seem that memes are neither necessary nor beneficial to the overall scientific project.
If Dennett were to abandon the idea of memes, and approach his analysis of religion from other more developed science, such as anthropology, then he may be able to build a case. As it stands right now though, his entire case seems to be internally inconsistent because of it dependence upon memes.
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First, I would add that genes are not irreducible. In other words, genes are self-contained—one cannot make a new gene by combining other genes and one cannot make another gene by deconstructing a gene. If the gene is combined or deconstructed, it will not be useful in biological terms. They can be no more complex or simpler than they already are. Because of this, one can map genes, locate genes, manipulate genes, and count them. Because of these properties, there are only a finite number of genes in any given organism.
Memes, however, are not irreducible. Given a meme, it can be broken into smaller memes, and those smaller memes can be broken into even smaller memes, perhaps with no end in site. Dennett uses the analogy of words. Words can be broken into letters, letters reduced to symbols, and symbols reduced to abstractions. Take for instance the sentence, "Memes can be scientifically observed and manipulated." If a word is a meme, then this sentence could be reduced to, "Memes meme meme memeficially memed meme memed." Then one could reduce the letters in the same way accordingly. Such a sentence could perhaps contain more memes than there are genes in the entire human body, depending on how a person wants to look at the words.
On these terms, the analogy breaks down. It would virtually impossible to treat memes in the same manner one treats genes; one cannot identify them, count them, or change them according. This doesn't make for good science, because there is no means to quantify, analyze or even recognize memes.
Second, I would add that the whole concept of a meme is somewhat self-defeating. As aforementioned, genes are a particular item: they are self contained, can be counted and worked on. The processes that work on genes are not genes themselves, but other biological processes, such as mutations, DNA replication, and protein building to name a few. Likewise, genes undergo selection, whether it is artificial or natural. Bad genes are weeded out of populations by selections and vice versa for good genes.
Memes however are different, because the processes that manipulate memes are memes themselves. If these processes are memes themselves, then it is possible that the processes will themselves be weeded out or replaced if the processes are deemed bad. If meme selection is a meme itself then it is possible that the standard for evaluating memes may change. It is even possible that the concept of meme themselves get weeded out. (It would essentially be the suicide of the meme!) Whatever happens in memetics, it seems that memes ultimate evaluating memes because viciously cyclical or self-defeating altogether. The processes that govern genes are independent of the genes themselves, and therefore are not subject to the same volitions genes are. This is not true for memes, so again the analogy breaks down here.
Third, even if memes are mutually exclusive and not self-defeating, what does one gain from using memes? McGrath pointed out that scientist and social scientists can and have applied evolutionary paradigms to other sciences without the use of memes, such as Freud and Marx. If memes catch on, it could perhaps slow, not help the process of science because sciences will have to be reframed in terms of memes. It would like going through the Manhattan Phonebook and giving everyone a new name in German. Such processes can over-complicate the issue unnecessarily, and not to mention the time that would be needed to undertake such projects. In the end, it seem that memes are neither necessary nor beneficial to the overall scientific project.
If Dennett were to abandon the idea of memes, and approach his analysis of religion from other more developed science, such as anthropology, then he may be able to build a case. As it stands right now though, his entire case seems to be internally inconsistent because of it dependence upon memes.
greer-heard review 4 :analysis of mcgrath’s arguments on dennett
4/07/2007 08:54:00 PM
In McGrath's lecture, he addresses some critical issue in the relationship of science and religion. This particular relationship has been of great interest for McGrath. He has a number of titles on the subject, including his three-volume set, A Scientific Theology, and a primer of the subject called, Science and Religion, and Introduction. He is perhaps one of the most qualified people on the subject.
Although McGrath's resumé is impressive, it does seem that his presentation did have at least one internal contradiction. When he suggested that religions are difficult to define and that one should look for the essence of religion, and then critiques Dennett and Dawkins for not having a clear definition for memes, it seems that he is muddying the water for religion, and attempting to clear for memes. It is almost an imperative that one needs clear definitions in science as to what something is, and it is probably just as important to have one when discussing metaphysical matters. The problem with metaphysics though it that it is a subjective project, and definitions will vary. Perhaps the solution would be to have some sort of middle ground: working definitions and qualified attributes. A working definition is not necessarily a dictionary like definition, but one that is clear enough and understandable enough to uniquely identify something in the context of discussion. The qualified attributes would be cataloged characteristics that the items in discussion all have, such as the object of worship for a given religion. This is admittedly daunting, but one thing that any aspiring philosopher learns quickly is that clarity of the utmost importance.
McGrath does a sufficient job of pointing out that Dennett's work is really lacking in science. He points out that Dennett has theories but fails to back them up. All Dennett does is appeal to the analogy that he uses through out as the science, and for McGrath, that isn't science at all, and it is as if Dennett is expecting the analog to genes to be the science and do the science for the argument.
On memes, McGrath excelled. He proposes a catalog of objections to memes, some which are lacking. Of the eight that were mentioned there were at least two could be scrapped, but he would still have a case. The idea that there is no testable model is implied by the fact that there is no definition for memes. It seems to be implied. The other one that could be dropped is the suggestions that memes make great use of circular explanations, and offers not explanation as to how they do this. Even if these two are dropped, that still leaves six objections, all which he develops rather well.
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Although McGrath's resumé is impressive, it does seem that his presentation did have at least one internal contradiction. When he suggested that religions are difficult to define and that one should look for the essence of religion, and then critiques Dennett and Dawkins for not having a clear definition for memes, it seems that he is muddying the water for religion, and attempting to clear for memes. It is almost an imperative that one needs clear definitions in science as to what something is, and it is probably just as important to have one when discussing metaphysical matters. The problem with metaphysics though it that it is a subjective project, and definitions will vary. Perhaps the solution would be to have some sort of middle ground: working definitions and qualified attributes. A working definition is not necessarily a dictionary like definition, but one that is clear enough and understandable enough to uniquely identify something in the context of discussion. The qualified attributes would be cataloged characteristics that the items in discussion all have, such as the object of worship for a given religion. This is admittedly daunting, but one thing that any aspiring philosopher learns quickly is that clarity of the utmost importance.
McGrath does a sufficient job of pointing out that Dennett's work is really lacking in science. He points out that Dennett has theories but fails to back them up. All Dennett does is appeal to the analogy that he uses through out as the science, and for McGrath, that isn't science at all, and it is as if Dennett is expecting the analog to genes to be the science and do the science for the argument.
On memes, McGrath excelled. He proposes a catalog of objections to memes, some which are lacking. Of the eight that were mentioned there were at least two could be scrapped, but he would still have a case. The idea that there is no testable model is implied by the fact that there is no definition for memes. It seems to be implied. The other one that could be dropped is the suggestions that memes make great use of circular explanations, and offers not explanation as to how they do this. Even if these two are dropped, that still leaves six objections, all which he develops rather well.
